A team of economists developed an excellent way to analyse and understand economic crisis in emerging economies. It is popularly called as the balance sheet approach
The paper lays out an analytical framework for understanding crises in emerging markets based on examination of stock variables in the aggregate balance sheet of a country and the balance sheets of its main sectors (assets and liabilities). It focuses on the risks created by maturity, currency, and capital structure mismatches. This framework draws attention to the vulnerabilities created by debts among residents, particularly those denominated in foreign currency, and it helps to explain how problems in one sector can spill over into other sectors, eventually triggering an external balance of payments crisis.
I am re-reading the paper for more insights.
I came across an excellent paper (which is also much shorter) from Atish Ghosh of IMF that helps understand the approach with some excellent examples. (The paper was presented in this IMF conference. (I covered a paper presented in this conference on Korean 1997-98 crisis; this paper also pointed to mismatches in Korean balance sheet).
It points that causes of emerging market crisis are different:
The financial crises that struck a number of emerging market countries in the 1990s and early twenty-first century were characterized by sudden reversals of capital flows that had pervasive macroeconomic consequences, including abrupt current account adjustment and collapsing real exchange rates and economic activity (Figure 1). But while the consequences of these crises were broadly similar, their causes appear to be bewilderingly different. Turkey (1993), Mexico (1994), and Russia (1998) were public sector funding crises. By contrast, the 1997 East Asian crises were mainly private sector phenomena. In Brazil (1998-99), Turkey (2000-01) and Argentina (2002) public sector debt dynamics played a key role—in the latter two cases, accompanied by a banking crisis. On the other hand, Uruguay (2002) was a banking crisis—caused by withdrawals of Argentine deposits—that spilled into a public sector debt problem and a balance of payments crisis.
Interesting. It also says economies can live with mismatches for quite a few years and what is needed is a crisis trigger which could really be anything:
Much like a bomb that requires both an explosive material and a detonator to cause an explosion, neither the balance sheet weakness nor the crisis trigger on its own is likely to cause (as much) mischief. Thus an economy can live with currency and maturity mismatches in private or public sectoral balance sheets for years if, serendipitously, nothing triggers a crisis. Yet there are many possible crisis triggers, both external—contagion, a terms of trade shock, a deterioration in market conditions—and domestic, such as an inconsistent macroeconomic policy stance (see Table 1 for a summary of vulnerabilities and crisis triggers in selected emerging market countries).
Table 1 is quite interesting as it summarises causes and triggers for each of the crisis.
Further, the paper presents balance sheet approach for three crisis- Thailand (1997), Argentina (2001) and Turkey (2000-01). In each of the crisis we understand though overall picture might look favorable, when we disaggregate the country’s balance sheet into say government, banks and non-banks we get some idea of the risks (mismatches to be precise). Each one is an excellent case study and a must read.
I think it will be very useful to do this analysis in each of the economies (atleast main ones) to identify what went wrong in this crisis.