Archive for January 8th, 2010

How do countries with low/high debt levels grow?

January 8, 2010

Every year at the AEA annual meeting, there is a Rogoff-Reinhart special. In 2008, they said the sub-prime crisis is similar to previous crisis. In 2009, they followed it up with aftermath of a crisis. This led to vast literature on what happens after the crisis, comparison of performances with financial crisis driven recession vs normal recession etc.

In 2010, they have released another paper looking at growth rates of economies at various debt levels. They look at advanced and emerging economies differently.

(more…)

Advertisements

Politics and History of FOMC

January 8, 2010

Kansas Fed has a quarterly publication called Ten.

I was reading the President’s (Thomas Hoenig) message in the Winter 2010 edition (a heavy pdf file).

In this, he gives a nice account of history and politics of FOMC. I can’t copy and paste it. So here is a briefer account.

  • FOMC was created by the banking act of 1935 largely through the work of Senator Carter Glass (of Glass-Steagall fame). There were many people associated with creating Fed in 1913 but Glass was most well-known for his role in design of Fed. So he was quite a popular senator and reformer even before he designed the Glass-Steagall Act.
  • In creation of FOMC, Glass faced stiff resistance from then Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles. Eccles favored a centralized approach and wanted the control of the Fed with himself (or Chairman) in Washington. Glass stressed on the decentralised approach giving each region some representation in the policymaking.
  • Eccles saw Great Depression as an opportunity to control things but could not explain to the Senate Committees how would centralization would help in times of depression and stock market collapses. Eccles was unable to come with a proper response.
  • This led to formation of the FOMC as we know it today. Glass also ensured regional Feds are free from any political interference and made required additions in the Act.

Great historical insights from Hoenig. Glass could see even then that Fed could be compromised and ensured walls are created between politics and Fed. 

We need similar hard-willed senators in US  to ensure Fed is not politically compromised. Bernanke and his team alone cannot prevent it as Fed (and other central banks) is created by the US Congress.

What a fascinating repeat of history all this is. We take central banks as independent, political free institutions as a given thing. Who could have thought the battle Fed had to fight in 1930s, it would have to fight in 2009-10 as well. Never underestimate history. It repeats itself when least expected.

Building independent financial regulators

January 8, 2010

Simon Johnson has written a super article comparing lack of independent defence experts Post WW-II and lack of independent financial experts post this crisis.

First the problem:

One striking aspect of the public debate about the future of derivatives – and how best to regulate them – is that almost all the available experts work for one of the major broker-dealers.

There are a couple of prominent and credible voices among people who used to work in the industry, including Frank Partnoy and Satyajit Das.  And there are a number of top academics, but if they help run trading operations they are often unwilling to go on-the-record and if they don’t trade, they lack legitimacy on Capitol Hill and in the media.

The same was the problem after WWII. There was a problem of defence companies capturing the defence department.

The defense sector faced a similar problem after World War II.  The rising importance of technology in combat meant that the military needed specialized suppliers who would invest large amounts of private capital in developing tanks, airplanes, radar, and other types of equipment.  But there was – and still is – a real danger that these companies would capture the Defense Department and push it to buy overly expensive and ineffective technologies (or worse).

President Eisenhower famously warned in 1960, as he was leaving office, about the military-industrial complex.  His concise remarks were brilliant – look at the text or YouTube versions.  And C. Wright Mills’ influential The Power Elite, published in 1956, put weapons suppliers at the center of our national power structure. (link: ; but this may be copyright violation.)

How did defence sector solve the problem? By building an independent defence lab

Constraining the power of military contractors is a hard problem — and you might say that we have not completely succeeded, depending on your view of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

But, at least in terms of weapons design and procurement, we have made some progress in developing a set of highly skilled independent engineers, as argued by Larry Candell in the latest issue of Harvard Business Review under the heading “A military approach to keeping the economy safe.”

Mr. Candell is an interested party — from a leadership role at  Lincoln Labs, he explains that this organization provides an independent design and evaluation capability that is not government bureaucracy and definitely not a profit-oriented military contractor. (Disclosure: Lincoln Labs is part of M.I.T., where I work.)

Same solution is suggested for financial markets

Irrespective of what you think about the defense business, Mr. Candell’s proposal vis-à-vis finance is intriguing. He thinks the government should set up its own arms-length labs (or sponsor nonprofit research organizations to do the same) that would concentrate on testing financial derivative products in test-bed-type settings.

This would not, of course, be the same as trading in real markets. But with today’s computer resources and plenty of unemployed finance talent at hand, it should be possible to develop individual people and a broader organizational capacity able to test the effects of various kinds of derivatives on customers, as well as on overall financial-system stability.

The proposed National Institute of Finance would have similar broad goals — and the National Institutes of Health is an appealing model — but as the institute is currently proceeding with industry backing (e.g., Morgan Stanley, Bank of America), we should be skeptical.

We definitely need independent derivatives experts who can be called to testify before Congress or work in an administration. They must have a deep understanding of financial markets, as well as hands-on experience with products that are dangerous to our economic health.

I had written about this breakthrough idea suggested by Candell. in my previous post as well – Breakthrough ideas for 2010.

I think it is not a bad idea. I mean we need to test as many ideas to help us regulate financial markets better. Some should click and some would fail.


%d bloggers like this: