Economic forecasting models have long been notoriously inaccurate in predicting inflation, and COVID-19 has further complicated the challenge. Those who heed current consensus forecasts of persistently low price growth could be in for a rude awakening.
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Many argue that the COVID-19 crisis is deflationary, because pandemic-mitigation measures have affected aggregate demand more adversely than aggregate supply. In the first months of the crisis, this was largely the case: in April 2020, for example, oil prices fell toward, or even below, zero.
But a detailed look at supply and demand reveals a more nuanced picture. In particular, the pandemic has shifted demand from services to goods, some of which have become more expensive, owing to production and transport bottlenecks.
In current consumer-price calculations, rising goods prices are partly offset by falling prices for services such as air travel. But in reality, pandemic-related restrictions mean that consumption of many services has fallen sharply; significantly fewer people are flying, for example. Many people’s actual consumption baskets have thus become more expensive than the basket statistical authorities use to calculate inflation. So, true inflation rates are currently often higher than the official figures, as reports have confirmed.
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In recent months, commodity prices, international transport costs, stocks, and Bitcoin have all risen sharply, and the US dollar has depreciated significantly. These could be harbingers of rising consumer prices in the dollar area. With inflation rates highly correlated internationally, higher inflation in the dollar area would accelerate price growth worldwide.
Too many are underestimating the risk of a rise in inflation, and sanguine model-based forecasts do nothing to alleviate my fears. Monetary and fiscal policymakers, as well as savers and investors, should not allow themselves to be caught out. In 2014, former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan predicted that inflation would eventually have to rise, calling the Fed’s balance sheet “a pile of tinder.” The pandemic could well be the lightning strike that ignites it.
The case for fiscal policy is not only that it is a more powerful (because more targeted) macroeconomic stabilizer than monetary policy, but also that government is the only entity apart from the financial system capable of allocating capital. If we are not willing to allow investment in technology and infrastructure to be shaped by a purely financial logic, then the need for what Mariana Mazzucato calls a “mission-oriented” public investment strategy that includes taxation policy becomes inescapable.
The second big discussion we need to have concerns the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy. In the United Kingdom, the expansion of QE since March 2020 has exactly tracked the increase in the budget deficit. Can the perception of BOE independence and the credibility of its inflation target survive when the central bank has been acting as an agent of the Treasury for the past year?
If the government is to be the active macroeconomic player, we need to work out how or whether the central bank should revert to its traditional role of checking fiscal excesses. But the fiscal rules themselves should be rewritten to allow for both more active counter-cyclical policy and a much larger government role in allocating capital than has recently been fashionable.
The pandemic presents an opportunity for an open public discussion of these matters. One hopes that this debate will replace the system of insider nods and winks and subterranean understandings that has shaped our economic fortunes – or misfortunes – for too long.