Prof R Nagaraj (was earlier with the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai) in this speech/article at TheIndiaForum:
In 2021–22, India’s GDP, net of inflation, was marginally higher by 1.5% compared with 2019-20, that is, the pre-pandemic year. It means that the country recovered in a year from the economic contraction caused by the pandemic . It also means that India lost two years of output and employment growth, with the per capita income falling marginally. The human costs of the pandemic may have been substantial – probably much more than what the government cares to admit – but the quick recovery provided a welcome relief. The output rebound was respectable compared to, say, China, which is still grappling with its policy flip-flops.
Though the Covid-19 shock is now behind us now, the world economy is grappling with the Russia-Ukraine war and distinct signs of the end of globalisation as we knew it. The world economy is apparently fracturing along geopolitical fault lines, along axes reminiscent of the Cold War era. With its large domestic market, though at low levels of per capita income, India is perhaps better placed to cope with the possible de-globalisation.
The pandemic, unfortunately, deflected the public’s and policymakers’ attention from India’s decade-long economic slowdown. The country’s growth declined in the 2010s after it witnessed rising growth from the early 1980s to the end of the 2000s. If the doubts raised on the official GDP estimates are reckoned with, the average annual growth rate during the decade is probably 4.5–5%, compared to official estimates of more than 6–7% per year. The growth reversal has reverberated through the economy, resulting in adverse employment effects, and a rise in the levels of absolute poverty and malnutrition.
The decade-long growth derailment was accompanied by an unprecedented fall in the fixed investment and domestic savings rates as proportions of the GDP.
Despite all the public attention the Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat initiatives attracted, the manufacturing sector’s share in fixed investment has fallen, contributing to deindustrialisation. India’s import dependence, especially on China, for edible oils to electronics hardware has gone up for lack of domestic production capacity. The dependence is so structural that it is hard to correct quickly with the price mechanism alone. This is a serious strategic shortcoming the country faces, perhaps without appreciating its full implication.
Policymakers seem to be seized of the problem of a contraction in the investment rate. Recent announcements of large projects in the manufacturing sector to reduce import dependence (semiconductor chips, for example) and boost employment (Tata’s proposal to assemble iPhones as a contractor for Foxconn) seem to suggest an upturn in investment is coming. The falling NPAs of the banking sector could improve the supply of bank credit to industry.
However, the private sector still seems hesitant, given global geopolitical uncertainties and the lack of domestic demand. But with deindustrialisation and a structural dependence on China, the government cannot simply wait for the private sector to wake up. It will have to step up public industrial and infrastructure investment to create policy certainty for the private sector. Raising public investment without jeopardising the fiscal and external balances will require making efforts to raise the domestic savings rate and boost long-term financial institutions.
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