Archive for the ‘Central Banks / Monetary Policy’ Category

Did Reserve Bank of New Zealand outgoing chief give himself a big pay rise? On what grounds?

September 29, 2017

Michael Reddell, the ever alert commenetator on NZ economy and their revered central bank has a startling piece:

….someone emailed me suggesting that the Reserve Bank Annual Report implied that the (now former) Governor, Graeme Wheeler had had a big pay rise.  And that did interest me, because outside the halls of the Reserve Bank Board it isn’t clear who would have thought that Wheeler had done something even approaching a stellar job as Governor.

Wheeler started at the Bank in September 2012, so we can’t get a read on his initial salary in the (June year) 2012/13 accounts.   But there are four years of annual reports when he will clearly have been the top earner in the Bank.    The relevant tables show the top earner received as follows during these financial years:

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Bitcoin vs Dollars: Which One is a Fraud? Which One is a Ponzi Scheme?

September 29, 2017

Mistalk blog reflects on Jamie Dimon calling Bitcoin a fraud:

Dimon’s statement on Bitcoin represents the irony of the year. Euros, dollars, etc. are precisely fabricated out of thin air.

That was not always the case for dollars. They were once exchangeable for gold. But euros right from the start were a complete fabrication.

The Eurozone problems we see today are a direct result of the fraudulent nature of Target2 guarantees on top of the fraudulent nature of the euro itself.

🙂 Even if thin air is not fully right, all these currencies are just based on government order. One can increase and decrease the currency at govt will and create mega monetary theories to justiify whatever they do: inflation target, Taylor rules and so on.

He says things like modern finance are a bigger fraud:

In an article that I wish I had written myself, Viktor Shvets, head of Macquarie’s AsiaPac equity strategy, accurately explains “Modern Finance”, Not Bitcoin, Is The Real Fraud.

If one describes Bitcoin as a fraud, how would one describe a ‘financial cloud’ that is at least 4x-5x larger than the underlying economies? It is unlikely that US$400 trillion+ of financial instruments circulating around the world would ever be repaid and most are now backed by assets that are already either worthless or are diminishing in value. How does one describe rates and the yield curve that are either directly determined by Central Banks (BoJ or PBoC) or heavily influenced by them (Fed or ECB)?

While we maintain that despite the presence of US$7.5 trillion of excess reserves (amongst G4+Swiss central banks), global deflationary pressures are so strong that break-out of inflationary pressures is unlikely. However, if public sectors continue to insist on suppressing business/capital market cycles, then some form of full credit market nationalization and/or currency debasement becomes inevitable.

Even fractional reserve lending:

If someone had a Yap Island stone and wanted to lend out three of them, that would not be possible. Nor can one have $100,000 worth of gold or Bitcoin and legally lend out $1,000,000 of it.

If someone tried to do so they would be convicted of fraud. Yet, via fractional reserve lending, banks can lend out money they do not have, and few think anything of it.

There are two distinct problems with fractional reserve lending as it exists today.

  1. Duration Mismatches
  2. Money Creation Out of Thin Air

CDs provide an easy to understand example duration mismatches. A person buying a 5-year CD gives up the right to use his money for 5-years in return for an agreed upon interest rate. Bank can and do lend out such money for 20 years.

Historically, borrowing short and lending long caused numerous bank runs and financial crises. Note that there are no reserves on savings accounts. Banks can lend that money out while guaranteeing you availability. If everyone tried to get their money at once, the system would implode. We have seen numerous examples in Europe recently.

It is a pity that much of this so called modern finance tools have become so ingrained in our textbooks and thinking, that we hardly question them. Infact these are the most admired jobs and calling anything which challenges the status quo is called as fraud. But then those whose houses are made of glass should not throw stones at others..

 

Confusions and Emptiness in RBI Board continue…

September 28, 2017

Ira Dugal just tweeted about how we do not have a Deputy Governor after nearly 2 months of Mr Mundra’s term getting over.

This led me again to the RBI Board webpage which has been under intense pressure ever since they decided on the note ban.

It says currently following are the Central Board members (accessed on 11 AM ,28/9/17):

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Uruguay to launch its digital currency platform…

September 26, 2017

Yday I learnt about Ecuador launching its digital currency in 2014 (more here). Though, it seems the initiatove has barely worked.

Now, there is more news that Uruguay is planning to launch its digital currency as well:

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Nigeria Central Bank’s Acting as Piggy Bank, MPC Member Says

September 26, 2017

Meanwhile in Africa, the old games between government and central banks continue.

In Nigeria, an MPC member accuses the central bank funding govt’s deficits calling former a piggy bank!

Nigeria’s central bank is acting like a “piggy bank” with its funding of the government, according to a member of the Monetary Policy Committee who said he struggles to understand the regulator’s economic rationale.

 Monetary data showed a “sharp rise” in the Central Bank of Nigeria’s financing of the government deficit this year, Doyin Salami said after the MPC’s July 24-25 meeting, according to a central bank statement published Tuesday. The regulator’s claims on the government had risen “twenty-fold” to 814 billion naira ($2.26 billion) from the end of 2016, while its purchases of government T-bills increased 30 percent to 454 billion naira, he said.
 “It is clear that the CBN has provided piggy-bank services to the federal government,” Salami said. “Whilst I still wonder what the underlying economics is, I sincerely hope it works.”
The MPC statement is here and the statement of the member is on page 36:
Perhaps the most challenging of the present characteristics of the economy in Nigeria is the adoption of a quantitative easing stance by the management of the Central Bank. Monetary data shows a sharp rise in the extent of CBN financing of the government deficit.
Highlights  of CBN financing of the Federal Government since Dec. 2016 are as follows–
  • CBN‟s claims on Federal Government (FG) at N814bn is twentyfold higher while the claims of Commercial Banks rose marginally by 0.4% to N4.6 trillion;
  •  30.0 per cent increase to N454bn in CBN‟s purchase of government T-Bills;
  • 5percent increase in FG Overdrafts to N2.8 trillion; and 
  • Increase in the „mirror account‟ from N3 billion at the end 2016 to N1.5 trillion in April 2017.
It is clear that the CBN has provided „piggy bank‟ services to the Federal Government.
That is some statement to make!

Supporting central banks and local currencies in the Western Balkans

September 25, 2017

Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovania celebrated its 20th anniversary recently.

ECB Member Benoît Cœuré gave a speech on the occasion and touched on an issue we hardly think much about. It has been seen that in small countries the balance sheets are not in the local currencies but in currencies of a dominant currency.

Any shock hits these small countries which run on unofficial currency as we saw in South East Asian crisis. The loans were in US Dollars and as crisis hit and the local currency depreciated, the value of  these liabilities increased manifold.

Even  in Balkan countries most of the balance sheets are in Euro. It is called as unofficial Euroisation. Euro is not an official currency but what happens in Euroarea plays a major role in these economies.

How does one work around this issue?

Let me therefore spend a few minutes on the one recommendation that is specific to candidate and potential candidate countries, albeit not uniformly to all, namely that the use of local currencies be strengthened.

As you know, the high degree of unofficial euroisation is a striking feature of the banking systems in the Western Balkans. In the region as a whole, on average 56% of total loans and 52% of total deposits are denominated in, or indexed to, foreign currencies, in most cases the euro.[3] This phenomenon, also known as currency substitution, is driven by many factors, such as low confidence in the domestic currency, which is often the result of not-so-distant memories of monetary instability.

Another factor relates to the fact that the risk premium on loans in the domestic currency is higher, thereby providing an incentive to take out foreign currency loans. Lower funding costs, in turn, are often supported through strong integration with the euro area via trade and financial channels, but also via migration and remittances, which contribute to the holding of bank deposits in euro. All this is conducive to widespread unofficial “euroisation”.

But a high degree of foreign currency use also has serious drawbacks. For example, unofficial euroisation, while being a sign of trust in the euro as a stable store of value, constitutes a financial stability risk in the event of sudden and substantial exchange rate fluctuations. Households and firms may suddenly no longer be able to service their foreign currency-denominated debt, creating credit risk for banks. The same holds true for dollarisation in other parts of the world, as the Asian financial crisis vividly demonstrated.

Unofficial euroisation also impedes monetary policy transmission and may limit the overall room for manoeuvre of monetary policy. In Albania and Serbia, for instance, where central banks have adopted inflation-targeting frameworks, exchange rate flexibility remains relatively limited as policymakers are mindful of adverse balance sheet effects resulting from sudden and substantial exchange rate fluctuations. In countries that have opted to stabilise the exchange rate in the first place, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, maintaining the credibility of the framework remains central to keeping financial stability risks contained.

Prospective EU countries that have their own legal tender and monetary policy have recognised these risks and constraints, and are thus making efforts to promote the use of the local currency, in line with the ECB’s recommendations. This is certainly not an easy task. Success crucially hinges upon the track record of the domestic monetary authority in maintaining monetary stability. To this end, central banks in the region have made laudable progress in recent years. Efforts need to be channelled towards extending this track record.

History teaches us that central banks’ success in sustainably maintaining confidence in the currency critically hinges on two elements: political independence and a clear mandate. The ECB was successfully built on these principles. Independence and a clear stability-oriented mandate ensure that central banks are not overburdened with pursuing other, potentially conflicting objectives, and that monetary policy makes the best possible contribution to growth and employment. They are therefore also a necessary condition for strengthening the use of local currencies.

Experience in other regions of the world – in Latin America, for example – suggests that targeted prudential measures as well as deeper local capital markets in domestic currency can reinforce the use of local currencies.[4] Such advances should ideally be embedded in a carefully designed comprehensive strategy involving all relevant stakeholders. Serbia adopted such strategies in 2012, and Albania has done so more recently, while other countries have started to put in place measures of this nature or are considering designing similar strategies.

So progress is clearly visible, in particular on the lending side, but more remains to be done. There are certainly no quick fixes, as currency substitution tends to be a sticky phenomenon. But the drawbacks of unofficial euroisation deserve policymakers’ attention. The expectation that countries will at some point join the EU, and eventually also the euro area, should not divert attention from such policy efforts.

Hmm..

 

When a central bank carries orders from political authorities due to fear: Case of Gambia

September 22, 2017

All kinds of things are happening at central banks world wide. One just pointed earlier how head of central bank of Ukraine got death threats from people and was forced to resign.

Now, we learn how the former head of Central bank of Gambia executed orders from former President out of fear:

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Launch of the Central Bank of Ireland’s archives

September 21, 2017

Philip Lane chief of Ireland Central Bank launches the central bank archives in this speech:

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Promoting Hong Kong as a hub for Corporate Treasury: Issues and Solutions

September 20, 2017

A nice speech from Normal TL Chan, CEO of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

He points how HKMA found out that taxation prevented Corporates to set up Treasuries in HK. Then they urged the govt to rectify the same:

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Bundesbank at 60: each country gets the inflation it deserves…

September 19, 2017

I just wrote y’day about how much Bundesbank matters to ECB policy and yet no German central banker is primed for the top job at ECB.

Least did I realise that year 2017 happens to be 60th anniversary of Bundesbank. Jens Weidmann, the chief of the central bank pays tribute and shares some fascinating history:

The Bundesbank first saw the light of the world on 4 July 1957, the day on which Germany’s Bundestag adopted the Bundesbank Act – alongside the Antitrust Act. Writing at the time, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper remarked that this day had witnessed “the adoption of two crucially important pieces of basic legislation for our entire economic system”.

When the Bundesbank Act came into force on 1 August 1957, the Bank deutscher Länder, the Land Central Banks and the Berlin Central Bank were merged to form a single institution, the Deutsche Bundesbank.

This new institution took over the headquarters of the Bank deutscher Länder in Frankfurt am Main. I wonder if you are aware that it almost ended up being based in Hamburg. Back then, the British forces were pushing for the Bank deutscher Länder to make Hamburg its home. But as it turned out, the Americans got their way, and the institution was established in their preferred location of Frankfurt, inside the US occupation zone.

That marked a major turning point for Frankfurt. The city evolved into Germany’s financial centre and later also succeeded in attracting the European Central Bank. But I don’t think Hamburg lost out in any way – Hamburg is an appealing, vibrant and economically successful location as it is.

He says though location of Frankfurt has little to do with Bundesbank’s success:

One thing I am quite certain about is that the choice of location did not influence the Bundesbank’s success, which I think can be put down to three key factors:

  • Its narrow mandate to preserve price stability,
  • Its independence, which allows it to pursue this objective even against political influence, if need be, and
  • An appreciation of the need for stability throughout much of the German population, which gave the Bundesbank the popular backing it needed to pursue its monetary policy objectives.

Ladies and gentlemen, the fundamental problem facing monetary policymakers is that they are caught in a conflict of objectives. In the short run, staving off inflation can sap economic momentum and drag on employment. On the other hand, the central bank can temporarily dampen unemployment if it tolerates a higher rate of inflation. This phenomenon is what economists call the Phillips curve relationship. It is a concept which crops up in a famous remark uttered by Helmut Schmidt in the early 1970s, when he once said that “I would rather have 5% inflation than 5% unemployment”.

An inverse relationship exists between inflation and joblessness because an unexpected increase in inflation pushes down real wages, lowers the price of labour, and thus tends to lead to a drop in unemployment.

But that only happens in the short run. Because employees will push for the higher rate of inflation to be offset, thus moving real wages and unemployment back to where they were before. There is a shift in the Phillips curve.

And if the unions, fearing a further increase in the rate of inflation, push through even higher wage increases, unemployment will rise as a result.

Let me use an everyday situation to shed more light on how this principle works. Imagine a person who is habitually late for work. Now, their partner might be able to outsmart them once by moving the hands of the kitchen clock forward by five minutes. But in the long run, that person will get used to the new time, so the clock will have to be put forward even more to prevent that person from leaving the house late in future.

That’s exactly how it is with monetary policy. If you fire up the printing presses to fend off unemployment, you will end up mired in high inflation and high unemployment.

He brings some episodes from German history which affirmed this fight for price stability:

Bearing that in mind, it was undoubtedly crucial that the Bundesbank, just like its predecessor, the Bank deutscher Länder, had independence from political control. Because German post-war history also bears witness to a number of situations in which the Bank was forced to head off political demands to loosen monetary policy.

One such situation that springs to mind is the famous “Gürzenich speech” which Konrad Adenauer delivered shortly before the Bundesbank was established. At that time, the Bank deutscher Länder had switched to a tight monetary policy stance because there was a risk that the brisk external demand might cause Germany’s economy to overheat. Konrad Adenauer, speaking in 1956 at Cologne’s Gürzenich Hall, warned that the tight policy would be “disastrous … for the man on the street”. A year later, the SPIEGEL magazine looked back at these events and wrote: “What is more, the credit constraints later turned out to be absolutely correct; they came just in time to prevent the boom from morphing into an inflationary economic gallop.”

Another situation I can think of occurred in the year 1979, when the government drummed up sentiment against an increase in the discount and Lombard rates. Manfred Lahnstein, State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance, presented his critique before the Central Bank Council and then went public with his misgivings. He expressed concerns that the policy rate hikes might endanger the economic upswing. As it turned out, the German economy expanded at a real rate of 4½% in 1979, even though policy rates were increased. The Bundesbank, then, did well to prevent the global inflationary tendencies from spilling over into Germany more strongly than they did.

Because the Bundesbank held its ground in both these cases and refused to be knocked off course, the Die Welt newspaper once dubbed it in retrospect the “bulwark on the Main”.

That was praise indeed for the Bundesbank, of course. For it had resisted the political pressure not because it was indifferent to the macroeconomic prospects, but it firmly believed, even back then, that monetary stability is the best contribution a central bank can make in the long run towards high levels of employment and sustained economic growth.

He also adds that what is also central to this is people’s appreciation of merits of stable currency.

But I am convinced that the Bundesbank only prevailed in its skirmishes with politicians because it could count on the general public’s appreciation of the merits of a stable currency. This brings me to the third of the key factors in the Bank’s success which I mentioned earlier on. A policy strictly geared to stability only stands a chance of success if the general public is sufficiently aware of the merits of stability. That’s because, in the long run, it is not right for democratic states to have a monetary policy which runs counter to public opinion.

On this topic, Otmar Issing once said that each country gets the inflation it deserves.

This is mainly due to German hyperinflation of 1920s continue to remain etched in people’s memories…

He then goes on to discuss current crisis and ECB’s role so far…

Superb throughout.

 

Primer on Islamic Banking

September 19, 2017

Superb primer by Arshadur Rahman of Bank of England. It explains the basics of Islamic Banking and does a great job.

Also interesting to know BoE planning to introduce a Shari’ah compliant facility. This will faciliate UK Islamic banks hold central bank assets:

  • ​Islamic banking is a relatively young but growing sector of the broader financial services industry. Numerous banks around the world offer Islamic, or Shari’ah compliant, financial products.
  • Some central banks offer Shari’ah compliant liquidity facilities to Islamic banks, affording them similar flexibility to other firms in managing their liquidity. Such facilities avoid the payment or receipt of interest, which is otherwise the most common basis for operating a liquidity facility.
  • The Bank is establishing a Shari’ah compliant facility, specifically a deposit facility to allow UK Islamic banks to hold central bank assets as part of their liquid assets buffer. This article explores the various ways in which this can be done, along with the model the Bank has chosen to adopt.

How religions have shaped all these banking and financing cultures and institutions..

Italy, France say ‘we don’t want Jens Weidmann to become ECB president’…

September 18, 2017

In many ways ECB is an ironical central bank.

The central bank is based in Germany and was designed as a replica of Bundesbank. Why? Because no other central bank had a reputation as the formidable German entity. So, if the European countries wanted to give up their mon policy to ECB, they said it better be like Bundesbank. Otherwise again we have a non-credible central bank creating all sorts of problems. Apart from the design, even the location was chosen as German as one always worried over political influence elsewhere. So much so both the central banks are located in Frankfurt within a 4 km distance.

Now, here comes the twist. Given strong German resemblance, one would impagine it is best to let German head the central bank. But no German has headed the central bank until today. Yes, one German has always been on the board but that is just about it. Earlier the German was a chief economist (Otmar Issing, Jurgen Stark). But even that is not the case today as Sabine Lautenschläger, who is a law person is on the board. Infact Axel Weber head of Bundesbank came close to being ECB chief but resigned from Bundesbank amidst lots of controversy.

So, the chief of ECB was first a Dutch, then a French and currently an Italian. They have kept Germany out as the fear remains that with a German not even little political maneuvering will be  possible. With the non-German as a head, one can expect some sympathies in case of a slowdown.

This was tested during the current crisis. Both Weber and Stark did not favor any monetary stimulus by ECB and had runs with the ECB leadership leading to resignations. Post Stark, it became easy for Draghi to take control and convince others for monetary stimulus. However, Bundesbank under the new chief Weidmann continued to oppose the policies.

As Draghi’s term is ending in 2019, the speculations have started early. The Italians and French are again opposed to having Weidmann as President:

In its new edition, Germany’s Der Spiegel magazine reported Friday that Italy and France would object to installing Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann as head of the European Central Bank after the end of Mario Draghi’s term in 2019.

It said government representatives from both nations had told German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble that they had nothing against a German at the helm of the ECB, “but it must not be Jens Weidmann.”

The report elaborated that southern eurozone nations feared current pragmatic and flexible crisis management measures such as the ECB’s huge bond-buying program as carried out under Draghi would no longer be possible under Weidmann.

While Schäuble said in May he would not take part in any debate about Draghi’s successor, numerous media reports had highlighted his and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s likely push for Weidmann to become the fourth guardian of the euro currency, after a representative from the Netherlands, France and Italy.

But there may be a whole bunch of contenders for the job of ECB president, among them Bank of France Governor Francois Villeroy de Galhau.

It cannot be taken for granted, though, that the fight for the post will include Jens Weidmann at all. A spokesman for the Bundesbank on Friday quoted him as saying he enjoyed his current job and would certainly stand ready for another term beginning May 2019, should he be asked to do so.

Weidmann has headed the German central bank since 2011.

Even if it is premature speculation, the European leaders will try hard to keep a German central banker heading the Board.

So much so for the ironies…

75th anniversary of Bank of China branch in Sydney and some interesting history…

September 15, 2017

Philip Lowe, chief of Reserve Bank of Australia shares some history from the Archives at the 75th anniversary.

Back in 1940s it was much easier to open a bank branch in Australia and tougher for people to travel to the country. How global banks and finance is built over the years is a tale of many a struggle:

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Equifax hackers are demanding ransom in Bitcoins but not dollars or Euros..Why?

September 12, 2017

The usual logic to the question is that bitcoins are anonymous and thus cannot be tracked, so it is a currency for the criminal class.

Jeffrey A. Tucker gives another perspective:

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Britannia, Jane Austen and the surprising tale of why money has long had a female face in England…

September 12, 2017

We usually are made to think/believe that finance is mainly “a men thing” and women are best kept out of the picture. However, this is not entirely true. This blog has written about women stock brokers  in early history of finance in NY. There must be evidence of their presence in other finance industries as well (for an unrelated area see women’s contribution in computer programming).

Following 2008 crisis, it was suggested that if there were more women in bank boards, may be banks would have been more stable. A recent paper does show this to be the case.

Now, Prof. Claudine van Hensbergen (Eighteenth-Century English Literature, Northumbria University, Newcastle) takes us further back in time. She reflects on the recent decision of Bank of England to print Jane Austin notes and says money has always had a female face in England:

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When Marco Polo saw the paper currency for the first time…

September 12, 2017

Dave Birch has a piece in Medium. 

History of paper money started in  China and via Marco Polo tales the world came to learn of it.

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Importance of understanding legal aspects of central banks: Case of appointment at Reserve Bank of New Zealand…

September 11, 2017

The role of economics and law especially in central banking is becoming an increasingly an important topic. But as economic students, we hardly study law and whatever little is mostly for contracts etc.

Given how central banks are basically a legal entity and what is broadly does is defined under law, there should be much more attention on central bank act, its governance and highly crucial appointment rules.  Things like appointment rules immediately raise the question of how and why central bank statutes differ across countries? The answers lie in political economy and other aspects which we just miss.

Croaking Cassandra blog has been writing on how the appointments of chief of New Zealand are not as per law. The crux of the matter is the currenct Gpvernor term is getting over and NZ is facing elections. The Government has decided to appoint an interim Governor and appoint a full-term one only after elections. But the central bank law does not allow this.

In its recent post, Cassandra again raises the issue:

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Estonia may launch its own virtual currency..

September 8, 2017

Interesting to know this:

If you’re already having trouble keeping track of all the virtual “cryptocurrencies” out there, then here’s another one that might end up on your radar: the Estonian “estcoin.”

Estonia isn’t the first country to consider launching its own digital currency as a rival to the better-known likes of Bitcoin and Ethereum—China’s central bank is quietly testing the idea of a new cryptocurrency, and Russia’s central bank is considering the same. However, Estonia may have an advantage in the public-sector digital infrastructure that it’s already built, and it sees the idea as a way of allowing people around the world to directly invest in the country’s digital aspirations.

 Over the last two-and-a-half years, Estonia has offered so-called e-residency to foreign entrepreneurs who want to virtually site their businesses in the country. The program gives people an Estonian government-backed digital ID, the ability to simply register an EU company, access to business banking and payments services, and tools with which to digitally sign documents. So far, more than 22,000 people have signed up from around the world.
In a Tuesday blog post, Kaspar Korjus, the managing director of the e-Residency program, said this experience gave Estonia an edge over other countries that are considering the introduction of national cryptocurrencies. Indeed, the estcoin could become bound up with the rest of the e-Residency ecosystem.

“No other country has come close to developing both the technology and the legal frameworks that would enable them to introduce and securely manage tradable crypto assets globally,” Korjus wrote. “The secure digital identities used by e-residents (as well as citizens and residents of Estonia) are now the ideal mechanism for securely trading crypto assets in a trusted and transparent digital environment. The tokens cannot be counterfeited and the government oversight means they cannot be used for illegal activities.”

Estcoins could be used to pay for public and private services in Estonia, and “eventually function as a viable currency used globally,” he said.

Why don’t we look at lessons from Indian banking history while resolving current NPA crisis..

September 8, 2017

It was interesting to read RBI DG’s speech on Indian banking NPA crisis. He starts pointing to the scale of the problem and then looks at examples of banking crisis in Japan (1990s)  and Europe (recently).

In the end, he asks several qs in words of William Wordsworth:

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Uzbekistan devalues currency by 50% overnight…

September 8, 2017

As markets opened on 5 September 2017, Uzbeks were in for a surprise as the currency opened  at 4200 soms compared to 8100 soms a day earlier.It was a long overdue move and welcomed. SO much so one person sayd to declare 5 Sep as a national day:

Even normally level-headed experts like Yuliy Yusupov were exuberant.  
“I don’t think it would be a bad idea to make September 5 a holiday — Convertibility Day. Outsiders wouldn’t understand. … For 21 years we’ve been waiting,” Yusupov wrote on Facebook.

More links  here:


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