Archive for the ‘Economics – macro, micro etc’ Category

Taking Malthus seriously

July 15, 2019

Jakob Brøchner Madsen, Peter Robertson and Longfeng Ye present new evidence showing Malthus was right:

The econometric evidence for the Malthusian trap in pre-industrial Europe has been weak. The column presents a new Malthusian model that, combined with new historical data for 17 countries, provides evidence of a much stronger Malthusian trap than the one found by previous research. This helps to explain the economic stagnation from the dark ages to the industrial revolution.


When central bankers speak about cloud services instead of the usual monetary policy stuff..

July 15, 2019

Central bankers/policymakers use the metaphor of looking up to clouds/skies for saying how economic growth is likely to be in future. Some say dark, some say blue and so on. In India (and South Asia), policymakers actually look at skies to figure state of monsoons.

With technology, using the word cloud means something much more. Mr Burkhard Balz of Bundesbank in this speech looks at how digitisation means central banks also have to change and look at their cloud services:


Inflation Co-Movement in Emerging and Developing Asia: The Monsoon Effect

July 12, 2019

Patrick Blagrave of IMF in this paper looks at the monsoon effect on inflation in developing Asia:

Co-movement (synchronicity) in inflation rates among a set of 13 emerging and developing countries in Asia is shown to be strongest for the food component, partly due to common rainfall shocks—a result which the paper terms the ‘monsoon effect.’ Economies with higher trade integration and co-movement in nominal effective exchange rates also experience greater food-inflation co-movement.

By contrast, cross-country co-movement in core inflation is weak and the aforementioned determinants have little explanatory power, suggesting a prominent role for idiosyncratic domestic factors in driving core inflation.

In the context of the growing literature on the globalization of inflation, these results suggest that common weather patterns are partly responsible for any role played by a so-called ‘global factor’ among inflation rates in emerging and developing economies, in Asia at least.


What drives demand for banknotes? Swiss edition

July 11, 2019

Interesting paper by Katrin Assenmacher, Franz Seitz and Jorn Tenhofen:

Knowing the part of currency in circulation that is used for transactions is important information for a central bank. For several countries, the share of banknotes that is hoarded or circulates abroad is sizeable, which may be particularly relevant for largedenomination banknotes. We analyse the demand for Swiss banknotes over a period starting in 1950 to 2017 and use different methods to derive the evolution of the amount that is hoarded.

Our findings indicate a sizeable amount of hoarding, in particular for large denominations. The hoarding shares increased around the break-up of the Bretton Woods system, were comparatively low in the mid-1990s and have increased significantly since the turn of the millennium and the recent financial and economic crises.

Well, the results are just opposite of what central bankers and government will tell you. They say people hoard money for all kinds of illegal transactions, black money and so on. They never tell you that most of the time common people hoard money for all the policy problems created by the government and central banks.

Safeguarding the euro in times of crisis: The inside story of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

July 10, 2019

In the backdrop of European sovereign debt crisis, the leaders first established European Financial Stability Facility in 2010 followed by European Stability Mechanism in 2012.

ESM has released a book (free pdf available) reflecting on the experiences of establishing the facility and so on:

Global financial leaders and ESM insiders provide a rich stock of perspectives and anecdotes that bring to life the urgency of the euro area crisis as well as the innovative solutions found to resolve it. As Europe strives to further strengthen its financial architecture, this books provides important lessons for future crisis management.
Should be a good read…

From optimal currency areas to digital currency areas..

July 10, 2019

Markus K Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau envisage that we will have digital currency areas in future:

Global Dimensions of U.S. Monetary Policy

July 9, 2019

Maurice Obstfeld of Univ of California Berkeley in this research paper says there are 3 channels:

This paper is a partial exploration of mechanisms through which global factors influence the tradeoffs that U.S. monetary policy faces. It considers three main channels.

The first is the determination of domestic inflation in a context where international prices and global competition play a role, alongside domestic slack and inflation expectations.

The second channel is the determination of asset returns (including the natural real safe rate of interest, r*) and financial conditions, given integration with global financial markets.

The third channel, which is particular to the United States, is the potential spillback onto the U.S. economy from the disproportionate impact of U.S. monetary policy on the outside world.

In themselves, global factors need not undermine a central bank’s ability to control the price level over the long term — after all, it is the monopoly issuer of the numeraire in which domestic prices are measured. Over shorter horizons, however, global factors do change the tradeoff between price-level control and other goals such as low unemployment and financial stability, thereby affecting the policy cost of attaining a given price path.


6 tips on how to read old economics books

July 8, 2019

Nice tips from Luka Nikolic (incredible for someone who is a Master’s student at the University of Ljubljana):

It is one thing to pick up a book and read it and a different thing to actually understand it. Attempting to read Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) or other old texts will give many lay readers a headache. The main reason for this confusion is the incomprehensible “King James” English in which those works were written. As a result, students rely on professors’ interpretations of some key concepts during lectures and focus on reading more contemporary literature, which is easier to read.

However, there is a way to read these pioneering books yourself and actually have fun in the process. Studying the forefathers of economics is key to understanding how the science evolved. You can find that some of the main problems of today—from protectionism to crony capitalism—were some of the key issues debated over 200 years ago, as well. The following instructions are meant for students or simply the layman economist. However, certain bits (especially the first point) may come in handy for the well-established individual in the profession, as well. 

1. Read Abridged/Modernized Versions 

2. Chapter Summaries

3. Focusing on Key Concepts: Most early books on economics run well into 800-1,000 pages. If you’ve ever read older fictional literature, especially Victorian-era, you might have noticed that the writers of that period really enjoyed writing long sentences. One of the reasons for this is that they were usually paid by publishers by the word/letter. Unfortunately, the same also holds for non-fiction literature.  

4. Read About the History of Economic Thought 

5. Do Not Focus Solely on Economics 

6. Be Familiar with the Times

Useful bit…

Sea change in global economic outlook

July 8, 2019

Mark Carney in this speech points how global economic outlook has gone through a sea change from optimistic to pessimistic.  He quotes from who other but Shakespeare:

A sea change is a profound transformation. The term was originally coined by Shakespeare in The Tempest,
of which there are five productions across Dorset this summer.These productions will mix tragedy and comedy in a play whose themes range from magic and creation to betrayal and revenge.

My focus is more limited and prosaic – but also more immediately relevant to your work. In recent months, there has been a sea change in financial markets driven by growing concerns over the global economic outlook. I will assess these global developments before turning to what they may mean for the UK’s economic prospects.

A good account of economic conditions…

Decline of economist as a central banker

July 8, 2019

My new piece in Business Standard.

I reflect on the recent nomination of Christine Lagarde as head of European Central Bank. It is interesting how French dominate Germans, on the Bundesbank styled European Central Bank.

In recent months we have seen how governments worldwide are preferring non-economists to head the central banks. Lagarde is an addition to the list.

Though, it is a choice which would be seen as not really a good one. Lagarde is former French Minister of Finance and you do not want to see former Ministers heading central banks, atleast not in European Central Bank, which prides on independence and autonomy.

Much more in the piece.


Does Japan vindicate MMT?

July 5, 2019

Koichi Hamada, advisor to Shinzo Abe in this piece says Japanese economy has followed MMT but one has to be careful drawing lessons:

Some MMT advocates – including Stephanie Kelton, a former economic adviser to Sanders – point to Japanas proof that the approach works. Despite high public debt, its economy is steadily recovering, and standards of living are high.

Moreover, MMT advocates point out, Japan’s expansionary monetary policies – a central feature of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic-revitalization strategy, Abenomics – have not generated a much-feared surge in inflation. Even within Japan, some argue that there is no need for a consumption-tax hike to fund public spending.

But there is a serious problem with this logic: Japan’s government is not as heavily indebted as is generally believed. Though Japan’s gross debt-to-GDP ratio, at 240%, is the highest in the developed world, what really matters – for the government, just like for private firms – is the net debt-to-GDP ratio, which accounts for real and financial assets. And Japan’s public companies have very large real assets.

In fact, by this measure, Japan is about on par with the US, and doing much better than France and Germany, according to the International Monetary Fund’s October 2018 Fiscal Monitor report, “Managing Public Wealth.” Further challenging Kelton’s assessment, Japan’s primary balance has improved under Abenomics, thanks to its economic recovery.

This does not mean that MMT has no merit, in Japan or elsewhere. In its campaign to increase consumption taxes, Japan’s Ministry of Finance drilled into the public psyche the concept of “Ricardian equivalence”: a government cannot stimulate consumer demand with debt-financed spending, because people assume that whatever is gained now will be offset by higher taxes due in the future. (It was this campaign that drove the MOF constantly to advertise the 240% figure.)

MMT can challenge this strict Ricardian belief, drawing attention to the potential of deficit financing, say, to boost employment through targeted social spending. And, indeed, Olivier Blanchard and Takeshi Tashiro have already proposed using limited deficit financing to help bring Japan’s interest rates up to zero, at a time when the government’s borrowing costs are low and the effectiveness of monetary policy is weak.


MMT works but upto the point inflation comes back:


When policymakers look at sky for clues: India’s “blue skies” vs World’s “no clear skies”..

July 5, 2019

The economic policymakers are increasingly looking up to the sky for guiding economic policy.

The Economic Survey for 2018-19 was all around the colour blue. The Survey points to Blue Sky thinking and even kept the colour of the survey as blue. The Preface explains:


Differences in Europe’s banking union and capital market union

July 4, 2019

A superb speech by Poul M. Thomsen of IMF.

He points that in order to understand differences between building banking union and capital market union, we need to look at key differences between bank based and market based finance:

Before getting to our concrete proposals for how to promote CMU, I want to define the issues a bit better by reminding you about some basic differences between bank-based and market-based finance.

Remember that the core funding base of banks is risk-averse depositors while that of the capital markets is yield-seeking investors. Through a long and bitter experience with financial panics we have developed a system where one fundamental difference between banking and the capital markets is the special privileges that banks enjoy under the public financial safety net.

This safety net has multiple strands. Banks enjoy the right to retail deposit insurance, backstopped by the state but funded by the industry. In addition, they enjoy the right to draw liquidity from the central bank against eligible collateral, and the right to place excess liquidity at the central bank—the safest counterparty in the land. All of this makes banks safer, but can also create moral hazard, meaning an incentive to take risk when one knows one is protected from some or all of the downside.

There is more. When banks fail—and fail they still do—the government’s promise to stand behind their retail deposits creates a natural role for government in their wind-up: this is why we have state-directed bank resolution, as distinct from private corporate insolvency. And, both to offset the moral hazard effects and to contain the financial stability risks arising from the mixing of leverage and maturity transformation, banks are prudentially regulated and supervised with the explicit mandate of reducing their probability of failure.

Contrast this with a relatively pure form of capital market intermediary: the mutual fund. Where banks focus on taking deposits with a promise to return them on demand and at face value, mutual funds take equity with the prospect of higher returns but also a disclaimer on potential losses. In the mutual fund industry, savers are exposed directly to the end-users of their funds with no public backstop; official oversight is mainly focused on ensuring transparency and good conduct by fund managers, with no explicit mandate to limit losses, and is often of an ex post nature, with a heavy emphasis on enforcement, contrary to ex anteprudential oversight in banking. Risk-taking here is modulated primarily by market forces.

One more point. Banks lend based on relationships and proprietary information. Given the relatively level playing field among banks—they all benefit from the same safety net—information gathering forms the essence of competition in banking. You collect as much data as you can on your borrowers, you nurture your customer relations in the pursuit of repeat business, and you never share your data with others. And information, of course, costs money—when we borrow from banks we pay for a broad range of overheads.

Mutual funds, in contrast, invest at arm’s-length. Here, the name of the game is reliable, comparable, publicly available information. The fund buys a tradable security after its managers have skimmed the prospectus—a much less costly endeavor than gathering bespoke information—and they don’t know much that other fund managers don’t also know. Here, success depends on wise investment choices, proper valuation practices, and portfolio diversification. For the recipients of mutual fund investments—the issuers of debt and equity securities—the benefit lies in being able to access savings with less margin taken by the middleman, and thus a lower cost of funds.

In view of these basic differences between banking and the capital markets, it is not surprising that plans for banking union have focused on the creation of a centralized supervisor of systemically important banks—the Single Supervisory Mechanism; a centralized bank resolution framework—the Single Resolution Mechanism, backed by a central fund soon to be backstopped by the European Stability Mechanism; and a common European Deposit Insurance Scheme—EDIS.

Thus, the two different forms of finance requires different approaches to development and regulations:

In contrast, the general principles that I just sketched suggest that the primary focus of efforts to create a CMU should be more on ensuring greater transparency; reducing variability in investor protection regulations; and improving insolvency regimes, both to improve recovery values and to facilitate smooth market exit. One key theme here is to facilitate market discipline, which requires an approach that is distinct from explicitly seeking to reduce the likelihood of failure through intrusive prudential supervision.

Really useful to think about several things in finance….

Facebook’s Libra Currency – Will it rewrite the crypto playbook?

July 3, 2019

My new piece on Moneycontrol on FB’s proposed currency Libra.

Implicit trade patterns in global cuisines: Who are the exporters and importers in cuisine market?

July 1, 2019

Fascinating paper by Joel Waldfogel of Carlson School of Management:

Perceptions of Anglo-American dominance in movie and music trade motivate restrictions on cultural trade. Yet, the market for another cultural good, food at restaurants, is roughly ten times larger than the markets for music and film. Using TripAdvisor data on restaurant cuisines, along with Euromonitor data on overall and fast food expenditure, this paper calculates implicit trade patterns in global cuisines for 52 destination countries. We obtain three major results.

First, the pattern of cuisine trade resembles the “gravity” patterns in physically traded products.

Second, after accounting gravity factors, the most popular cuisines are Italian, Japanese, Chinese, Indian, and American.

Third, excluding fast food, the largest net exporters of their cuisines are the Italians and the Japanese, while the largest net importers are the US – with a 2017 deficit of over $130 billion – followed by Brazil, China, and the UK.

With fast food included, the US deficit shrinks to $55 billion but remains the largest net importer along with China and, to a lesser extent, the UK and Brazil. Cuisine trade patterns appear to run starkly counter to the audiovisual patterns that have motivated concern about Anglo-American cultural dominance.


Canada enters 50th consecutive year with a Floating Exchange Rate…

July 1, 2019

Lawrence L. Schembri, Deputy Governor of Bank of Canada, in this speech speaks about merits of floating exchange rate.

Canada shifted to floating exchange rate in 1970 and has gained immensely from this strategy:

This is my second speech in our public engagement campaign called “Toward 2021.” We call it that because 2021 is the next renewal date for our five-year inflation-control agreement with the Government of Canada, first adopted in 1991. For the renewal, we’ve committed to a wide-ranging review of our monetary policy framework to ensure it best achieves our mandated goal of price stability and thereby promotes strong and sustainable output and employment growth for the benefit of all Canadians. The framework has two components: our 2 per cent inflation target and our flexible exchange rate.

The inflation target normally gets most of the attention, so the value of our floating dollar risks being overlooked at a time when the performance of flexible exchange rates is coming under greater scrutiny in international policy circles.

My purpose today is to review the evidence and make the case that Canada and many other open economies have been well-served by a market-determined flexible exchange rate. In particular, Canada’s experience with inflation targeting underpinned by a floating currency is an instructive example of the most durable monetary policy framework in the post-war period.1 The flexible exchange rate has helped our economy adjust to external shocks, primarily changes in commodity prices. Although our floating currency does not completely offset the impact of all of these shocks, it has complemented the Bank’s inflation target to help achieve low and stable inflation and keep our economy functioning well.

While we’re not going to alter the flexible exchange rate component of our monetary policy framework, it is incumbent on policy-makers to review even successful regimes regularly to ensure that they are serving the best interests of Canadians. To this end, it’s worthwhile to explore the four main benefits of our floating dollar:

    • It allows monetary policy independence to achieve domestic price stability.
    • It facilitates adjustment to external shocks, thereby buffering their impact on economic activity.
    • It contributes to policy clarity and effectiveness.
    • It promotes financial sector development.

We also examine recent criticisms of flexible exchange rates. Because exchange rates are market prices that trade daily, they are intrinsically volatile. This volatility increases the cost of making international transactions and poses risks that have to be managed, especially by exporters and importers. Nonetheless, we come down squarely on the side that the benefits of a flexible exchange rate for Canada far exceed any such costs.

Tearing up Mankiw’s economics textbook!

June 28, 2019

Alex Tabarrok in MR Blog discusses a recent article which suggests tearing up the economics textbook which is basically one written by Greg Mankiw:

Robert Samuelson, the economics columnist, has written a column titled, It’s time we tear up our economics textbooks and start over. What he actually says is we should tear up Greg Mankiw’s Principles of Economics:

But as a teaching device, [Mankiw’s] “Principles of Economics” has fallen behind. There’s little analysis of the impact of the Internet and digitalization on competition and markets. I couldn’t find either Apple or Facebook in the index; Google gets a few mentions.

Likewise, little attention is paid to the 2007-2009 Great Recession, the worst business downturn since the Great Depression, which also receives scant coverage relative to its significance. (Together, the two recessions receive about three pages, from 725 to 727.)

There’s some misleading information about the Great Recession and parallel financial crisis. On Page 691, we have this: “Today, bank runs are not a major problem for the U.S. banking system or the Fed.” This would surely surprise the Fed, which poured trillions of dollars into the economy to prevent financial collapse.

Mankiw’s assertion can be defended on narrow, technical grounds. There was no run by retail depositors (people like you and me) against commercial banks. We were protected by deposit insurance. But there was a huge run — a panic — by institutional investors (pension funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, endowments) that withdrew funds from traditional banks, investment banks and the commercial paper market.

…Mankiw’s textbook needs more than a touch-up; it needs a major overhaul. It has very little history: for example, the industrialization of the 19th century. Nor is there much about the expansion of the global economy. China gets a few mentions.

The market for principles textbooks, however, is competitive and there are alternatives to Mankiw. Krugman and Wells, for example, have a lot of very interesting boxes on the world economy and historical events. Modern Principles of Economicsdoesn’t use boxes but we illustrate the principles of economics with historical events and, of course, we use tech companies such as Facebook and Apple to discuss network effects and coordination games. Samuelson is a bit harsh on Mankiw, however, because it’s very easy to overwhelm students with details. Like physics, economics is powerful because it explains many things with a handful of principles. It’s true that Mankiw’s book doesn’t have much history or color–his paradigmatic market is the market for ice cream–but abstraction can focus attention. The tradeoff, of course, is that it can also lead to vanilla economics. But the Mankiw text is clearly written and the micro text is especially well organized, one reason we chose a similar organization for Modern Principles.

In Modern Principles we illustrate the ideas with more interesting markets but we work with them repeatedly so students don’t become overwhelmed. Our paradigmatic market is the market for oil. We use it to teach supply and demand, cartels, and the importance of real macroeconomic shocks. Using the market for oil also lets us teach about some important events in world history such as the OPEC oil crisis and the industrialization of China.

Samuelson is correct that the financial crisis was a run on the shadow banks but he’s incorrect that this isn’t taught to students of Econ 101. Here’s Tyler on the financial crisis. He covers leverage, securitization, asymmetric information, bank runs, fire sales and the rise of the shadow banking system. Students with the right textbook are well informed about the financial crisis and the economic principles that can help us to understand, analyze and perhaps avoid future financial crises.


Who would have thought anything like this will be wrotten for Greg Mankiw’s books which are used across the world.

Here is Mankiw’s response:

Washington Post columnist Robert Samuelson argues “It’s time we tear up our economics textbooks and start over.” He uses my book as a prime example. Perhaps not surprisingly, I disagree. My summary of Samuelson’s article: Economics textbooks should be more like economics journalism, says an economics journalist.

Mr. Samuelson fails to fully appreciate the difference between journalism and textbook writing. Journalists are always looking for things that are new, for how the world has changed. That’s why we call it the news. The editor of the science section of a newspaper would not be interested in a article explaining that Isaac Newton figured out the workings of gravity. Not newsworthy, the editor would say.

Textbook writers, on the other hand, emphasize those things that are true, important, and unknown to the typical reader (an 18 year old college freshman). Newness has little relevance. The lessons of Adam Smith do not apply only to the 18th century, the lessons of David Ricardo do not apply only to the 19th century, and the lessons of John Maynard Keynes do not apply only to the 20th century. They are timeless ideas that may not make good news stories but should be central to introductory economics. Just as Newtonian mechanics should remain central to introductory physics.

Yes, textbooks need to evolve as we learn more and as the world changes. New examples also show students how to apply the classic ideas to the issue of today. (The 9th edition of my principles text, available in about six months, includes a feature discussing social media like Facebook as a common resource.) But it would be a mistake for teachers of introductory economics to focus excessively on today’s hot topics at the exclusion of timeless truths.

I had a 6th grade teacher who used to refer to newspapers as a “perishable commodity.” That seems right, given their relentless focus on newness. Good textbooks, however, are more like durable goods. They do not go out of date nearly as quickly.


Did the Versailles peace treaty trigger another world war?

June 28, 2019

Professor David Reynolds (international history at the University of Cambridge) in this interesting article says there is more to 1919 treaty than is understood:

In trying to unpack the argument that the peacemakers – deliberately or not – sowed the seeds of future conflict, we need first to remember that the fate of Germany was not the only issue on their agenda. The whole map of Europe had been ripped apart by war and revolution, bringing down four great dynastic empires – the Romanovs, Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns and Ottomans – that had ruled the centre and east of the continent for centuries. Out of the debris, nationalist politicians and their armies were already creating new states, such as Czechoslovakia, and resurrecting old states like Poland. So, the Paris conference was an attempt to clean up the mess: the peacemakers did not start with a blank slate.

Nor were the three major Allied powers of one mind. Clemenceau and the French were focused obsessively on controlling Germany, whose population was 50 per cent larger than that of France and whose economy in 1913 had been the most advanced in Europe. The British prime minister, David Lloyd George, though anxious to gain reparations from Germany, saw the German economy as vital to the recovery of Europe. He feared that too punitive a peace would feed a desire for revenge and encourage the spread of Bolshevism across the continent. US president Woodrow Wilson was more detached from European specifics: his consuming ambition was to create a League of Nations to guarantee peace and security.

The resulting peace treaty was therefore a messy compromise between the Big Three. The French recovered Alsace and Lorraine, ceded in 1871 after defeat to Prussia, but were not allowed to annex the Rhineland in perpetuity. Instead Britain and America offered a joint guarantee of French security if Germany attacked again. Wilson got his League of Nations, but on terms that seemed to open up the prospect of unlimited obligations to keep the peace without having adequate power to do so.


Further, what about Keynes’ Economic Consequences of Peace:

Which brings us back to Keynes and the Carthaginian peace. Was it reparations that really embittered Germans, and broke their economy? No precise bill was fixed at Paris: the Treaty of Versailles simply established the principle that Germany and its allies were responsible for the damage caused by their war of aggression (article 231), while also acknowledging in article 232 that their resources were not adequate to make “complete reparation”. Similar pairs of balancing statements were inserted in all the treaties with the defeated powers but only the Germans (for propaganda reasons) presented the reparations issue as an Allied imputation of ‘war guilt’ – a phrase never used in the treaty.

In 1921, an Allied commission meeting drew up a schedule of reparations payments for Germany of 132 billion gold marks, or about $33 billion, plus interest. This draconian headline sum was, however, largely window dressing to satisfy French and British hardliners. In practice, the amount the Allies intended to exact was about 50 billion marks over 36 years, which still seemed a huge sum.

Viewed historically, though, the reparations bill was the latest round in a Franco-German game of tit for tat. When French policymakers considered reparations in 1919, they had in mind the provisions of the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, which Bismarck imposed on France after its devastating defeat. He, in turn, had looked back to Napoleon’s treatment of Prussia in the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. The 1921 London Schedule of Payments imposed at most an annual burden of around 8 per cent of German national income – less than the 9–16 per cent that France paid annually in reparations after 1871. So the bill, most economic historians agree, was not financially intolerable.

The real issue was political. The Germans had not accepted defeat and had no intention of paying. For the French, conversely, extracting reparations represented a desperate attempt to secure an economic substitute for the decisive victory that the Allies had failed to win on the battlefield in 1918. In short, as one German official put it, the struggle over reparations was “the continuation of the war by other means”.

Successive Weimar governments went to great lengths to avoid paying their regular instalments of reparations. In the early 1920s, the economics ministry bought substantial amounts of foreign currency to help push down the value of the German mark and make German exports more competitive. An export boom, according to one key economic adviser, would “ruin trade with England and America, so that the creditors themselves will come to us to require modification” of the 1921 schedule.

So much history..

The Shifting Wealth of Nations: How Argentina fares worst amidst all countries…

June 27, 2019

Prof Tim Taylor on his blog points to this interesting research by Micheal Cembalest of JP Morgan.

Cembalist looks at socialism across world and find Nordic nations are hardly socialistic.


Indian public refusing certain coins as legal tender: Demonetisation fears keep lurking..

June 27, 2019

I recently learnt that people are not accepting certain coins of Rs 10 denominations.

RBI released yet another circular saying all coins are legal tender (see previous appeals as well):


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